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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Petitioner, Lacey Mark Sivak (Sivak), appeals the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The facts leading to Sivak's conviction for first-degree murder and his initial 
sentence of death for the murder of Dixie Wilson are summarized in State v. Sivak (Sivak 
1}, 105 Idaho 900, 992, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), as follow: 
On April 6, 1981, Dixie Wilson, an attendant at a self service gas 
station, was discovered near death by a customer. She had been stabbed 
numerous times and shot several times. Evidence indicated she had also 
been sexually molested. She later died from her wounds. 
Witnesses saw two men inside the station with Wilson shortly 
before the murder, one they identified as Randall Bainbridge. Appellant 
and Bainbridge were seen together before and after the killing. 
Appellant admitted being present during the robbery and murder, 
but claimed he was merely an innocent bystander. He claimed he did not 
participate in the robbery and murder and did not carry a firearm. 
However, appellant's fingerprint was found on the murder weapon. 
Evidence indicated appellant had previously worked at the station, 
was known to the victim, had expressed animosity toward her, and had 
called to inquire who would be on duty at the station on April 6, 1981. 
The gun used in the attack was found in a storage shed rented by 
appellant. 
An Information and Information Paii II were filed on May 7, 1981, charging 
Sivak with robbery, first-degree murder with alternatives for premeditated murder and 
felony-murder, use of a firearm during the robbery and murder, and a persistent violator 
1 
enhancement. (#14435, R., pp.19-21.) 1 An Amended Information was filed September 
21, 1981, charging Sivak with the same offenses, but separating first-degree murder 
based upon premeditation and the felony murder doctrine as two separate counts. (Id., 
pp.83-84.) The state commenced presenting its case-in-chief on September 22, 1981, and 
the trial was concluded on September 29, 1981 (id., pp.86-102), when the jury found 
Sivak not guilty of premeditated murder, but guilty of robbery, felony-murder, and 
possession of a firearm during commission of the robbery and murder (id., pp.103-08). 
After a sentencing hearing (id., pp.130-31 ), the district court sentenced Sivak to death for 
Dixie's murder and imposed a fixed life sentence for robbery and an additional fifteen 
years for possession of a firearm to be served consecutively (id., pp.134-41 ). 
Because the district court failed to deliver its written findings to Sivak and his 
attorney in open court, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the case for imposition of 
sentence in open court. Sivak I, 105 Idaho at 901 n. l. The district court conducted a 
hearing, but denied Sivak's motion to present additional evidence, merely reading its 
prior findings regarding imposition of the death penalty and reimposing Sivak's death 
sentence. (#15022, R., pp.16-20.) The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Sivak's conviction 
and sentence. Sivak I, supra. 
Sivak filed his first post-conviction petition in September 1984, which was denied 
after an evidentiary hearing. Sivak v. State (Sivak II), 112 Idaho 197, 199, 731 P.2d 192 
(1987). Addressing a double jeopardy claim based upon the felony-murder and robbery 
1 Contemporaneous with this Brief, the state has filed a Motion to Take Judicial Notice, 
requesting this Court take judicial notice of the underlying Clerk's Record from Sivak's 
original case in State v. Sivak, Idaho Supreme Court docket No. 14435, the initial 
resentencing, State v. Sivak, Idaho Supreme Court docket No. 15022, and two documents 
from Sivak's resentencing which is still pending before the district court. 
2 
convictions, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded, "Sivak's robbery conviction merged as 
a lesser included offense into his felony murder conviction as charged. Therefore, we 
must vacate Sivak's robbery conviction and, on remand, direct the district court to 
dismiss it." Id. at 213. The supreme court also reversed Sivak's death sentence because 
the district court denied his motion to present additional mitigation evidence prior to the 
court reimposing his death sentence. Id. at 200-03. The supreme court expressly noted 
that, but for the need to remand for resentencing, it would not have addressed many of the 
issues raised by Sivak because "those issues were or should have been raised on direct 
appeal." Id., p.216. The court further explained that, "[i]f the sentencing judge 
determines that the death penalty is the appropriate sentence, it shall be administered 
consistent with LC.§ 19-2719." Id. 
On remand, the district court again sentenced Sivak to death. State v. Sivak 
(Sivak III), 119 Idaho 320, 321, 806 P.2d 413 (1990). However, the Idaho Supreme 
Court reversed Sivak's death sentence because the district court failed to properly weigh 
the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors pursuant to State v. Charboneau, 
116Idaho 129, 774P.2d299(1989). Sivak III, 119Idahoat321-22. 
On remand, Sivak was again sentenced to death, and subsequently filed a post-
conviction petition, which the district court denied. State v. Sivak (Sivak IV), 127 Idaho 
387, 389, 901 P.2d 494 (1995). The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Sivak's death 
sentence and the denial of post-conviction relief. Sivak IV, supra. 
Sivak next commenced federal habeas proceedings. Sivak v. State (Sivak V), 134 
Idaho 641, 643, 8 P.3d 636 (2000). During litigation of his federal habeas case, Sivak 
filed his third post-conviction petition, which the district court denied. Id. at 644. The 
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Idaho Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Sivak 
V, supra. 
After Sivak returned to federal court to complete litigation of his federal habeas 
petition, the federal district court denied him all habeas relief. Sivak v. Hardison, 2008 
WL 782877 (D. Idaho 2008). While the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on all 
guilt-phase issues, on September 7, 2011, the Ninth Circuit reversed on a sentencing 
claim stemming from the suppression of exculpatory evidence and false testimony 
associated with Jimmy Leytham, who testified at Sivak's trial that Sivak confessed to 
murdering Dixie. Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011). Sivak's case was 
remanded to the federal district court with instructions for the federal district court to 
enter an appropriate order requiring the state to resentence Sivak. 
On remand to the state district court, the state filed a notice of intent to seek the 
death penalty. Prior to his resentencing, on September 14, 2012, Sivak filed the instant 
Pro-Se Appellant's Post-Conviction Application and various attachments, apparently 
contending his double jeopardy rights were violated because he was acquitted of 
premeditated murder, but convicted of felony-murder. (#40583, R., pp.4-21.) The state 
was ordered to file an appropriate answer or response (id., pp.26-27), which was filed 
October 24, 2012, asserting Sivak's successive petition was barred by I.C. § 19-2719 
because it is premature since the state was seeking the death penalty, the sentencing had 
not commenced, and LC. § 19-2719(6) mandates that appeals from a death sentence and 
denial of post-conviction relief be consolidated. (Id., pp.32-35.) Alternatively, the state 
asserted Sivak's successive petition was untimely because it raises a guilt-phase issue that 
should have been filed within forty-two days of entry of judgment, and was a claim that 
4 
was known or reasonably could have been known when his pnor post-conviction 
petitions were filed. (Id.) Finally, the state denied "the substance of the claim," asserting 
counts two and three of the Amended Information did not charge separate charges, but 
"alternative means of committing the murder." (Id.). 
The district court issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss advising Sivak his 
successive petition would be dismissed unless he provided the Court "with evidence in 
the form of an affidavit or other admissible evidence to support his Petition." (Id., pp.41-
42.) After Sivak responded with a number of virtually illegible and repetitive pleadings 
(id., pp.43-98), on December 12, 2012, the district court denied post-conviction relief, 
explaining that since his resentencing is still pending it was "untimely because a sentence 
of death is possible and if a death sentence is imposed, the time for filing a petition for 
post-conviction relief would then begin to run." (Id., pp.99-100.) The court expressly 
declined to address the merits of Sivak's successive petition. (Id., p.100.) Sivak filed a 
Notice of Appeal on December 17, 2012. (Id., pp.105-09.) After a short remand, Final 
Judgment was filed June 19, 2013. 
5 
ISSUES 
Contrary to I.A.R. 35(a)( 4), Sivak has failed to state any issues on appeal. The 
state wishes to phrase the issue on appeal as follows: 
1. Because Sivak has failed to comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(4) by including a 
"statement of issues," has Sivak waived the issues allegedly raised in his opening 
brief requiring that the district court's decision denying post-conviction relief be 
affirmed on appeal? 
Alternatively, 
2. Whether reviewed under I.C. § 19-2719 or the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act, has Sivak failed to establish his successive petition is timely 
because his double jeopardy claim should have been raised in his initial direct 
appeal, during his first post-conviction case, or is premature because he has not 
been resentenced. 
Alternatively, 
3. Has Sivak failed to establish his double jeopardy rights were violated when he 
was convicted of felony-murder but acquitted of premeditated murder? 
4. Because Sivak's appeal is being brought frivolously and without foundation, 




Sivak Has Waived The Issues On Appeal Because He Failed To Comply With 
I.A.R. 35(a)(4) 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a) governs the content of an appellant's opening brief, 
which requires a list of issues on appeal. Subsection ( 4) governs the Statement of Issues, 
and reads as follows: 
A list of the issues presented on appeal, expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement 
of issues should be sh01i and concise, and should not be repetitious. The 
issues shall fairly state the issues presented for review. The statement of 
issues presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue fairly 
comprised therein. 
As explained in Everhart v. Washington County Road and Bridge Dept., 130 
Idaho 273, 274, 939 P.2d 849 (1997) (citation omitted), "Contrary to I.A.R. 35(a)(4), 
[Sivak] did not designate issues on appeal, which is cause for denying an appeal. It is not 
the duty of this Court to review the record for errors." This rule has been regularly 
applied to prose litigants. See e.g. Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 60 n.7, 244 P.3d 
197 (2010); Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354,362, 815 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1991); 
Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687, 961, 809 P.2d 1166 (Ct. App. 1991). "However, that 
rule may be relaxed if the briefing addressed an issue through authority or argument." 
Everhart, 130 Idaho at 274 (citing State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959, 961, 783 P.2d 298 
(1989) (overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 985-87, 
842 P.2d 660 (1992)). Nevertheless, it appears the appellate courts' "relaxation" of Rule 
35(a)( 4) has been in cases involving an "unusual posture" where both parties have "a 
complete opportunity to develop the factual background and legal arguments" relating to 
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the issue on appeal. State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 422, 224 P.3d 485 (2009). 
Moreover, it is a discretionary standard that is not mandated in every case. See State v. 
Korn, 148 Idaho 413,415 n.1, 224 P.3d 480 (2009) ("we may relax our reading of I.A.R. 
35(a)(4) and address the district court's actions") (emphasis added). 
Because significant portions of Sivak's brief are illegible and his arguments are 
unorganized and convoluted, the state does not have the opportunity to fully understand 
and comprehend the nature of his arguments and have a complete opportunity to develop 
the factual background and legal arguments to address whatever claims he is trying to 
raise on appeal. Moreover, Sivak is not a novice to the appeal process, having raised a 
plethora of prose appeals in prior cases. See e.g., Sivak v. State, et al., 130 Idaho 885, 
950 P.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1997); Sivak v. State, 119 Idaho 211, 804 P.2d 940 (1991); Sivak 
v. Ada County, 118 Idaho 193, 795 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1990); Sivak v. Ada County, 115 
Idaho 766, 769 P.2d 1138 (Ct. App. 1989). Indeed, proceedings have commenced to 
establish Sivak is a vexatious litigator under I.C.A.R. 59. See Sivak v. Halverson, et al. 
Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2011-11071. 
Therefore, based upon his failure to comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(4), any issues he 
has raised on appeal have been waived and should be rejected by this Court. 
II. 
Sivak Has Failed To Establish His Double Jeopardy Claim Was Timely Filed 
A. Introduction 
To the extent Sivak is contending he raised a guilt-phase double jeopardy claim in 
his successive post-conviction petition based upon his conviction for felony-murder 
allegedly being encompassed in his acquittal for premeditated murder, his claim fails 
8 
because it was not timely filed. Either it should have been raised on direct appeal, during 
his first post-conviction case, or is premature because final judgment has not been 
imposed stemming from his resentencing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The applicability of a statute of limitation to an action under a given set of facts is 
a question of law subject to free review on appeal. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 
796 P.2d 121 (1990); Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 
2008); Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 628, 836 P.2d 1088 (Ct. App. 1992). An 
appellate court will defer to the factual findings made by the district court unless they are 
clearly erroneous, requiring Sivak to establish the court's factual findings are "not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record." Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 82 P.3d 787 (2002); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 256, 869 P.2d 571 
(Ct. App. 1994). However, this Court exercises free review over the application of the 
relevant law to those facts. Gabourie, 125 Idaho at 256. 
"When this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon 
the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2 719, the proper standard of review this Court should 
utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of 
section 19-2719 have been met, and rule accordingly." Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51, 
55, 156 P.3d 552 (2007) (quoting Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 575, 51 P.3d 387 
(2002)), remanded on other grounds Hairston v. Idaho, 552 U.S. 1227 (2008). 
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C. Sivak Was Required To Raise His Double Jeopardy Claim On Direct Appeal 
At the time Sivak murdered Dixie and was convicted and sentenced, LC. § 19-
490l(b) read as follows:2 
This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy 
incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the 
sentence or conv1ct10n. Except as otherwise provided in this act, it 
comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or 
other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the 
conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them. 
As recognized in Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469, 474, 491 P.2d 733 (1971), 
(overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez v. State, 122 Idaho 20, 22,830 P.2d 531 (1992), 
and State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226-27, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), LC. § 19-4901(b) 
prevents petitioners from raising claims in post-conviction proceedings that should have 
been raised on direct appeal. In Smith, the petitioner raised three trial errors. The court 
rejected those claims, explaining: 
In dealing with these alleged trial errors, we must note that an application 
for post-conviction relief cannot be used as a method of appealing from a 
judgment of conviction. The statute itself provides that this remedy is not 
a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in 
the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction. There is 
no doubt that by this provision the legislature intended to incorporate the 
2 Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b) was amended in 1986 and 2001, and now reads as follows: 
(b) This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any 
remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from 
the sentence or conviction. Any issue which could have been raised on 
direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-
conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the court, on the basis of a 
substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the 
asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of 
the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have 
been presented earlier. Except as otherwise provided in this act, it 
comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or 
other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the 
conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them. 
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law contained in those habeas corpus cases which hold that such an 
extraordinary remedy cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal. 
Id. (quotations, citations, and brackets omitted). 
In Hedger v. State, 124 Idaho 49, 50-51, 855 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1993), the court 
of appeals affirmed the dismissal of a post-conviction petition raising a double jeopardy 
claim because the claim should have been raised on direct appeal and post-conviction 
proceedings could not be utilized in lieu of raising the claim on direct appeal. 
Likewise, Sivak's claim that his conviction for felony-murder violated his double 
jeopardy rights because he was acquitted of premeditated murder should have been raised 
during his first direct appeal. As repeatedly explained by the Idaho Supreme Court, 
Sivak's case has never been reversed on the basis of any guilt-phase claim, but only for 
resentencing. Sivak III, 119 Idaho at 326 ("The remand in Sivak 11 was only for the 
purpose of resentencing, not to allow Sivak to begin again his assault on his 
conviction."); Sivak IV, 127 Idaho at 390 ("We note that the remand granted in Sivak 111 
was for the limited purpose of resentencing and, therefore, a challenge to a jury 
instruction given at trial which could have been raised in the appeal of the conviction 
(Sivak I) is no longer a viable issue."). He is not permitted to utilize post-conviction 
proceedings to raise a claim that should have been raised on direct appeal. Because his 
double jeopardy claim should have been raised on direct appeal, the district court's 
decision to dismiss his successive post-conviction petition must be affirmed. 
D. Sivak's Successive Post-Conviction Petition Is Governed By LC. § 19-2719 
Idaho Code § 19-2719 sets forth special appellate and post-conviction procedures 
in all capital cases. Fields v. State, 151 Idaho 18, 253 P.3d 692, 697 (2011). Capital 
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post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post-conviction proceedings which are 
governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA), are civil in nature 
and governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 
470,903 P.2d 58 (1995). Idaho Code§ 19-2719 does not eliminate the applicability of 
the UPCP A in capital cases, but acts as a modifier and "supersedes the UPCP A to the 
extent that their provisions conflict." McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 
144 (1999). 
Specifically, LC. § 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity to raise 
all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction relief petition which 
must be filed within forty-two days after entry of judgment. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). The only exception is provided in LC. § 19-2719(5), 
which permits a successive petition "in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated 
that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been kno'0.1J1 within 
the time frame allowed by the statute." Id., 120 Idaho at 807. A capital defendant who 
brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has a "heightened burden and must 
make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that petition fit within the narrow 
exception provided by the statute." Pizzuto. 127 Idaho at 471. 
Additionally, claims which were not known or which could not have reasonably 
been kno'0,IJ1 within forty-two days of judgment "must be asserted within a reasonable 
time after they are known or reasonably could have been known." Paz v. State, 123 
Idaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701. In ascertaining 
what constitutes a "reasonable time," the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, 
[A] reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have 
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known of the claim, unless petitioner shows that there were extraordinary 
circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim within that 
time period. In that event, it still must be filed within a reasonable time 
after the claim was known or knowable. 
Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,727,202 P.3d 642 (2008). 
A successive post-conviction petition is "facially insufficient" if it merely alleges 
"matters that are cumulative or impeaching or would not, even if the allegations were 
true, cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction or sentence." I.C. § 19-2719(5)(b). If 
evidence is merely cumulative with evidence already within the possession of the defense 
at the time the first petition for post-conviction relief is filed, a procedural bar exists 
mandating dismissal of the successive petition. Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 647-49, 8 
P.3d 636 (2000). 
Even if the petitioner can meet these mandates, LC. § 19-2719(5)(a) details the 
additional requirements that must be met before the successive petition may be heard: 
An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be 
heard because of the applicability of the exception herein for issues that 
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not be 
considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a 
precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) material 
facts stated under oath or affirmation by credible persons with first hand 
knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that 
fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or 
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed. 
r.c. § l 9-2719(5)(a). 
If a capital petitioner fails to comply with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2719, the 
issues are "deemed to have [been] waived" and "[t]he courts of Idaho shall have no 
power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such 
relief." LC. § 19-2719(5); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700. Likewise, failure to meet the 
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requirements of LC. § l 9-2719(5)(a) mandates dismissal of the successive post-
conviction petition. Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-90, 17 P.3d 230 (2000). 
Even if Sivak's double jeopardy claim was properly raised in a post-conviction 
petition instead of on direct appeal, it is untimely because it was not raised in his first 
post-conviction petition. Sivak's double jeopardy claim was clearly known when the jury 
returned its verdict acquitting him of premeditated murder and convicting him of felony-
murder. Indeed, Sivak reasserted a double jeopardy claim in the context of his sentencing 
that was based upon the same basic argument and was initially raised in his direct appeal. 
Specifically, Sivak contended during his first post-conviction case that the district court 
"violated his constitutional rights when it made findings that Sivak's claims were 
inconsistent with the jury's verdict as to the premeditated nature of the murder." Sivak 
IT, 112 Idaho at 214. Noting the court addressed this claim in Sivak I, 105 Idaho at 907, 
the court rejected Sivak's claim, concluding, "By couching this issue in somewhat 
different terms in the post-conviction relief proceedings, Sivak is suggesting that both the 
district court and this Court have perpetuated a violation of his constitutional rights to fair 
sentencing trial and not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. We disagree 
and continue to adhere to our previously stated view on this issue." Sivak II, 112 Idaho 
at 214.3 
Of course, Sivak also raised another double jeopardy sentencing claim based upon 
his contention that his conviction for robbery was an included offense of his conviction 
for felony-murder. Sivak II, 112 Idaho at 210. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed and 
merged Sivak's robbery conviction with his felony-murder conviction. Id. at 212-13. 
3 Sivak's double jeopardy sentencing claim was also raised in federal habeas and rejected 
by the Ninth Circuit. Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d at 918-91. 
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Sivak clearly knew of the instant guilt-phase claim stemming from his contention 
that his acquittal of premeditated murder precludes his conviction for felony-murder 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Because Sivak has failed to establish his double 
jeopardy claim was not known or could not reasonably have been known when he filed 
his first post-conviction petition, his claim was properly dismissed by the district court. 
Moreover, even though the state is no longer seeking the death penalty at Sivak's 
resentencing, because the state's withdrawal of its notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty was completed after Sivak's successive post-conviction petition was litigated 
before the district court, his double jeopardy claim is still governed by LC. § 19-2719, 
and is untimely. 
E. Sivak's Successive Post-Conviction Petition Is Premature Under LC. § 19-2719 
As detailed above, Sivak's case has been remanded for resentencing, which has 
yet to take place. Idaho Code § 19-2719(3) does not permit the filing of a post-
conviction petition in a capital case until after the filing of the judgment. Moreover, any 
appeal stemming from the denial of post-conviction relief "must be part of any appeal 
taken from the conviction or sentence." LC. § 19-2719(6). Because Sivak has yet to be 
resentenced, both his successive petition and the appeal stemming from the dismissal of 
his successive petition are premature, requiring dismissal of the instant appeal. 
F. Sivak's Successive Post-Conviction Petition Is Barred Under LC. § 19-4908 
Should this Court conclude, since the state is no longer seeking the death penalty 
at his resentencing, that Sivak's successive guilt-phase post-conviction petition is 
governed by the UPCPA, his claim still fails because it is untimely. 
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Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) establishes the statute of limitation for filing a post-
conviction petition as follows, "An application may be filed at any time within one (1) 
year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or 
from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." "The 
'appeal' referenced in that section means the appeal in the underlying criminal case." 
Gonzales v. State, 139 Idaho 384, 385, 79 P.3d 743 (Ct. App. 2003). "[T]he limitation 
period begins to run, after an unsuccessful appeal, when the Idaho Supreme Court or the 
Idaho Court of Appeals issues a remittitur." Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205, 207, 984 
P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-4908 governs the filing of successive non-capital post-
conviction petitions and establishes new claims "may not be the basis for a subsequent 
application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason 
was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended 
application." However, because Sivak has failed to establish or otherwise assert 
"sufficient reason" for not having raised his double jeopardy claim in his initial post-
conviction case, particularly since it was raised in a sentencing context, he is not entitled 
to the protections afforded by LC. § 19-4908. 
Even if he could make the requisite showing, Sivak's claim is still untimely. 
While "[t]here is no time limit set forth in these statutes regarding the filing of a 
subsequent petition," the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized LC. § 19-4908 
"contemplates there may be circumstances under which a successive petition may be filed 
if the trial court finds a claim for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in the original petition" or the new claim was not known to the petitioner within 
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the one-year limitation period, "yet raises important due process issues." Charboneau v. 
State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870 (2007). After examining LC. § 19-2719 and the 
timeliness of successive post-conviction petitions in capital cases, the supreme court 
"applied the same 'reasonable time' standard that governs its examination of post-
conviction petitions in capital cases" to non-capital cases and concluded, "In determining 
what a reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, we will simply consider it on a 
case-by-case basis, as has been done in capital cases." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904-05. 
Absent a showing that the limitations period should be tolled, the failure to timely file a 
petition for post-conviction relief whether within the one-year period of LC. § 19-4902 
or within a reasonable time of the discovery of new claims - is a basis for dismissal of the 
petition. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066 (2009); Evensiosky v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 191, 30 P.3d 967 (2001). 
Subsequent to Charboneau, the Idaho Supreme Court significantly modified the 
"reasonable time" standard in capital cases. In Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 
P.3d 642 (2008), the supreme court recognized in Dunlap v. State, 131 Idaho 576, 961 
P.2d 1179 (1998), a petition filed within forty-two days after the claim was known or 
reasonably should have been known was a reasonable time, while in Rhoades v. State, 
135 Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243 (2000), a six-month delay in filing a successive petition was 
not a reasonable time. Based upon the "reference to the forty-two day time limit in 
Dunlap," the supreme court concluded: 
[A] reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have 
known of the claim, unless the petitioner shows that there were 
extraordinary circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the 
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claim within that time period. In that event, it still must be filed within a 
reasonable time after the claim was known or knowable. 
Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 727. 
The supreme court has recognized the reasonable time standard in capital cases is 
not statutorily based, but is premised upon the court's "construction of statutory language 
barring claims that a defendant knew or reasonably should have kno-wn within 42 days 
after judgment was filed." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Likewise, the reasonable time 
standard in non-capital cases is not statutorily based, but is based, in part, upon the 
recognition that the district court's "analysis of 'sufficient reason' permitting the filing of 
a successive petition must necessarily include an analysis of whether the claims being 
made were asserted within a reasonable period of time." Id. at 905. In other words, the 
reasonable time standard in non-capital cases is also based upon construction of statutory 
language barring claims that a defendant knew or reasonably should have knov\TI within 
one year after the Remittitur is issued. Moreover, although not raised by Sivak, Pizzuto 
raised a concern regarding whether the "reasonable time" requirement 1s 
"unconstitutionally vague because it is determined after the fact and does not give a 
petitioner adequate advance notice of when the petition must be filed." Pizzuto, 146 
Idaho at 727. Undoubtedly, this argument will be raised in a non-capital case. Therefore, 
because the reasonable time standard in non-capital cases is premised, at least in part, 
upon the reasonable time standard in capital cases and the standard in capital cases has 
been modified, and to provide non-capital petitioners clear guidance regarding when 
successive petitions are due, the state requests that this Court adopt the 42-day limitation 
period from Pizzuto as the standard for filing successive petitions in non-capital cases. 
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Even if Sivak was permitted to file a successive petition, because it was not raised 
within 42 days after the claim was known or reasonably could have been known, the 
petition is untimely. However, as detailed above, even if the Court declines to adopt the 
42-day time limit from capital cases for successive petitions in non-capital cases, Sivak's 
successive petition was not timely filed because it was raised years after it was kno\\<TI or 
reasonably could have been known. 
III. 
Because Sivak Was Merely Charged With Alternative Ways Of Establishing First-Degree 
Murder That Both Contained Separate Elements, He Has Failed To Establish A Violation 
Of His Double Jeopardy Rights 
A. Introduction 
Although not entirely clear from his brief or his successive post-conviction 
petition, it appears Sivak contends his double jeopardy rights were violated because he 
was convicted of felony-murder, but acquitted of premeditated murder. Because the 
Amended Information charged Sivak with Dixie's murder under alternate theories, which 
both contained separate elements that had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, his 
claim fails on the merits. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether a defendant's prosecution or punishment complies with constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law over which [this Court] exercises 
free review." State v. Moffatt, 154 Idaho 529, ---, 300 P.2d 61, 63-64 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(citing State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378 (Ct. App. 2000)). 
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C. Sivak Has Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Double Jeopardy Rights 
As explained in State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 756, 810 P.2d 680 (1991), the 
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a defendant from being convicted of both a greater and 
lesser included offense. "The double jeopardy clause protects against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, protects against a second prosecution for 
the same offense after conviction, and protects against multiple punishments for the same 
offense." Id (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977)). As recently explained by the 
Idaho Supreme Court, Idaho applies the test from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 
299, 304 (1932), "to determine whether an offense is a lesser included offense under the 
statutory theory." State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 261 P.3d 519 (2011); see also 
Moffatt, 300 P.3d at 63 ("a review of Idaho Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that 
we apply the Blockburger test to determine whether there has been a double jeopardy 
violation under the United States Constitution."4 Under the Blockburger test "two 
4 The state recognizes that in State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841, 291 P.3d 1036 
(2013), the Idaho Supreme Court concluded Idaho follows the "pleading theory" for 
defining lesser included offenses. However, McKinney is clearly at odds with Flegel, 
supra, which was not even discussed by the supreme court in McKinney, let alone 
overruled. Reference to a "pleading theory" of double jeopardy appears to have its 
genesis in State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433, 614 P.2d 970 (1980), where the issue 
was "whether the charge of assault with a deadly weapon is a lesser included offense in a 
charge of attempted robbery, as alleged herein, such as to preclude conviction under the 
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and the 
Idaho Constitution." With respect to the Fifth Amendment, the supreme court, quoting 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), stated: "It has long been understood that separate 
statutory crimes need not be identical either in constituent elements or in actual proof in 
order to be the same within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition." Thompson, 
101 Idaho at 433. The court then noted, "[m]any jurisdictions have expanded the 
definition of lesser included offenses beyond the statutory theory and utilize what is 
called the 'indictment' or 'pleading' theory," and stated, "Idaho has adopted this pleading 
approach both by statute and by case law." Id. at 433-434 (citing LC. § 19-2312 and 
cases). To the extent Thompson used Brown as a platform for applying a test more 
lenient than Blockburger, it must be noted that the United States Supreme Court actually 
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statutory provisions are deemed to constitute the 'same offense' so as to preclude 
imposition of multiple punishments unless 'each provision requires proof of a fact which 
the other does not."' Sivak II, 112 Idaho at 206 n.8 (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 
304). "If each [offense] requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger 
test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the 
crimes." Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785-86 n.17 (1975). 
In Wilson v. Bellegue, 554 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit addressed a 
nearly identical question that is being raised by Sivak. Wilson was initially indicted with 
nine counts of aggravated murder, one count of intentional murder, four counts of felony-
murder, first and second-degree kidnapping, third-degree assault, and abuse of a corpse, 
all stemming from the murder of Misty Largo. Id. at 819. At Wilson's arraignment, the 
prosecutor dismissed the four counts of felony-murder. Id. After Wilson was convicted 
of all counts, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed his ten murder convictions, but 
affirmed the remaining counts. Id. He was subsequently retried on eight counts of 
aggravated murder that set forth different theories of aggravated murder and one count of 
intentional murder. Id. On five counts of aggravated murder, the jury convicted Wilson 
of the included offense of attempted aggravated murder, on the intentional murder 
charge, he was convicted of the included offense of attempted murder, but the jury could 
not reach a verdict with respect to the three remaining counts of aggravated murder. Id. 
applied the Blockburger analysis, that joyriding was a "lesser included offense" of auto 
theft because it was "clearly not the case that each statute requires proof of a fact which 
the other does not." 432 U.S. at 167 (citation and quotations omitted). The Supreme 
Court, consistent with Blockburger, also acknowledged the result would have been 
different had the state legislature "provided that joyriding is a separate offense for each 
day in which a motor vehicle is operated without the owner's consent." Id. at 169 n.8. 
Therefore, Brown does not support a broader pleading theory analysis under the Fifth 
.Amendment. 
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at 820. Eventually, the state announced its intention to retry Wilson on three felony-
murder charges. Id. at 821. Addressing whether the decision to retry Wilson on felony-
murder charges constituted a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause under the "same 
offense analysis," the Ninth Circuit applied the Blockburger test, examined Oregon's 
murder statutes, and concluded that, "as defined under Oregon law, felony murder is not 
the same offense as intentional murder, the crime of which Wilson was acquitted." Id. at 
829. Examining Oregon's statutes, the court explained: 
Section 163.115(1 )(a) of the Oregon Revised Statutes straightforwardly 
states that "criminal homicide constitutes murder when it is committed 
intentionally." By contrast, in defining felony murder, Oregon law does 
not require the defendant to intentionally cause death. Indeed, in cases in 
which a defendant commits the underlying felony with the assistance of 
another person, the statute does not require the defendant to have 
personally killed the victim at all. Furthermore, the crime of felony 
murder requires that the murder be committed "in the course of and in 
furtherance of' one of several statutorily enumerated felonies. This 
requirement does not apply to intentional murder. 
Id. ( citations omitted). 
Under Idaho's murder statutes, Sivak's case is virtually indistinguishable.5 In 
relevant part, I. C. § 18-4001 defines murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being .. 
. with malice aforethought." Idaho Code § 18-4003 defines the degrees of murder, and 
subsection (a) establishes, in relevant part, that murder "which is perpetrated by any kind 
of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder of the first degree." Subsection 
(d) defines the felony-murder doctrine as "[a]ny murder committed in the perpetration of, 
or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or mayhem." 
Therefore, as explained in State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 386, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985), 
5 Idaho's murder statutes have been amended several times since Sivak murdered Dixie. 
The state is relying upon the statutes as they existed at the time of Dixie's murder. 
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"In a prosecution for felony-murder, the state is relieved of the burden of proving that a 
defendant had the specific intent to kill and instead need only prove that all individuals 
charged as principals had the specific intent to commit the predicate felony." In other 
words, to establish premeditated murder, the state must establish the element of intent to 
kill and premeditation, neither of which are required to prove felony-murder. However, 
to establish felony-murder, the state must establish specific intent to commit the 
underlying felony, which is not mandated to establish premeditated murder. Because the 
state is required to prove different elements to establish premeditated murder and felony-
murder, there cannot be a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause merely because Sivak 
was acquitted of premeditated murder, but convicted of felony-murder. 
Moreover, relying upon Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631 (1991), the Ninth 
Circuit has recognized the state is permitted to charge alternative theories of committing 
a single offense. Williams v. Warden, 422 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2005). Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has not only determined that charging alternative theories of committing a 
single offense is constitutional, but the jury is not even required to agree upon a single 
means of committing the crime. Schad, 501 U.S. at 631. 
Likewise, in Nesbitt v. Hopkins, 86 F.3d 118, 121 (8 th Cir. 1996), the Eighth 
Circuit agreed that "American law has long permitted the assertion of alternative theories 
of first-degree murder in one murder prosecution without concern that the defendant is 
subject to 'double jeopardy' if convicted on one theory, but acquitted on the other." 
Finally, Sivak has provided no authority, and the state is aware of none, for his 
claim. In Williams, 422 F .3d at 1011, the Ninth Circuit recognized there is no "authority 
for the proposition that a simultaneous conviction and acquittal on the self-same offense 
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violates the Double Jeopardy Clause," and concluded Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 
184, 190-91 (1957), "supports the opposite contention" by "sanction[ing] a simultaneous 
acquittal and conviction on the 'same offense"' because the defendant was acquitted of 
the greater offense of first-degree murder, but convicted of the lesser offense of second-
degree murder. 
The state clearly charged Sivak with alternative theories of committing the same 
murder, which does not violate his double jeopardy rights even if he was acquitted of one 
theory (premeditation), but convicted under the second theory (felony-murder). Because 
Sivak has failed to establish a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the district 
court's decision denying post-conviction relief must be affirmed. 
IV. 
Because Sivak's Appeal Is Frivolous, The Court Should Award the State Costs and 
Attorney Fees on Appeal 
"An action for post-conviction relief is civil in nature and is governed by the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 103 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Pursuant to I.AR. 40, "costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party 
unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." Idaho's appellate courts have 
awarded costs to the prevailing party in post-conviction appeals. See Esquivel v. State, 
128 Idaho 390, 392, 913 P.2d 1160 (1996) ( costs to respondent); Carter v. State, 108 
Idaho 788, 796, 702 P.2d 826 (1985) (costs to appellant). 
An award of attorney fees should also be made to the state pursuant to LC § 12-
121 and I.A.R. 41. "An award of attorneys fees under LC.§ 12-121 is proper only where 
the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended 
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frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 225, 
192 P.3d 1036 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "Pro se litigants are 
held to the same standards and rules as litigants represented by an attorney and this Court 
has previously awarded attorney fees against a pro se litigant that pursued an appeal 
frivolously." Rizzo v. State Farm Ins. Co., --- P.3d ---, 2013 WL 2232287, *10 (Idaho 
2013) (citing Twin Falls Cnty. v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442,445, 80 P.3d 1043 (2003)). The 
Idaho Supreme Court has awarded attorney fees for failing to comply with I.AR. 35, 
Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 61, 244 P.3d 197 (2010), including I.AR. 35(a)(4), 
Jensen v. Doherty, 101 Idaho 910,911,623 P.2d 1287 (1981). 
Even a cursory review of Sivak's brief establishes this appeal presents such a 
circumstance. Not only has Sivak failed to comply with I.AR. 35(a)( 4) by providing a 
statement of issues, but his brief fails to explain how the district court erred by 
concluding his successive petition was untimely, or why his double jeopardy claim was 
not raised on direct appeal and how his claim would prevail on the merits even if it had 
been timely filed and raised on direct appeal. Indeed, to the extent it can even be read 
because of legibility issues, Sivak's brief is a compilation of disjointed conclusions that 
are not supported by either the law or facts of his case. Moreover, as detailed above, 
Sivak is not a novice to the judicial system either in the context of criminal, civil, or 
appellate procedure. Rather, in the context of a death-sentenced murderer, he has been 
the most prolific litigator, repeatedly filing frivolous motions even when he has been 
represented by counsel. Presumably, he filed the instant successive petition and the 
appeal therefrom because he was well aware that he would not be appointed counsel 
because of the frivolous nature of his claim. 
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Because of the frivolous "arguments" advanced by Sivak and the time and 
resources the Office of the Attorney General has devoted to responding to his frivolous 
appeal, the state requests it be awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's denial of Sivak:'s successive 
post-conviction petition be affirmed, and that the state be awarded costs and attorney fees 
on appeal. 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013. 
~I~ -c;? 
?- -
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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